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THE CREDIT SUPPLY CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM 
A FAVAR MODEL WITH SIGN RESTRICTIONS 
Juan S. Holguín1 Jorge M. Uribe2 
Abstract 
We test whether the credit channel of the monetary policy was present in the United States’ 
economy from January 2001 to April 2016. To this end, we use a factor augmented vector 
autoregression (FAVAR) and we impose sensible theoretical sign restrictions in our 
structural identification scheme. We use the expected substitution effect between bank 
commercial loans and commercial papers to identify the credit supply channel. We found 
that the credit channel appears to have operated in the US economy during the sample 
period. However, when we split the sample we found that the credit channel did not operate 
after the subprime crisis (close to the Zero Lower Bound of the interest rate). This result is 
robust to changing the sign restriction horizons. It supports current views in the literature 
regarding the ineffectiveness of the credit channel as a mean to foster real economic 
activity during crises episodes.  
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1. Introduction 
Monetary policy, as the main tool available for policy makers within the paradigm of 
business cycles stabilization, is supposed to have a significant effect on economic activity, 
at least in the short run (Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Woodford 2003; Galí 2015). Such 
effects may appear by different means, which include traditional expected impacts of 
monetary policy on real investment and consumption (Hicks 1937; Jorgenson 1963), effects 
related to nominal and real exchange rate dynamics (Mundell 1963; Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1995), impacts on the composition of firm’s and financial institutions’ balance sheets 
(Bernanke and Blinder 1988; Bernanke and Gertler 1995; Kashyap and Stein 1995) and 
impacts on the wealth of households through variations in stock market prices (Tobin 
1969), among others3. 
One traditional channel of the monetary policy, identified in the field following the seminal 
work by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), is the bank-lending channel. Under the assumption 
that from the firm’s perspective, funding by issuing bonds is not a perfect substitute for 
funding through bank loans, these authors argue that monetary policy would operate not 
only by impacting interest rates in the bond market but also by influencing the credit supply 
decisions made by financial institutions. This would modify the balance sheet of the lenders 
and, in turn, would affect the optimal consumption and investment paths of the agents 
within the economy. This effect should be more significant for those agents mostly 
dependent on external funding to conduct their consumption and investment plans, such as 
small firms (Kashyap et al. 1993; Kwan 2010). 
                                                        
3 See Boivin et al. (2010) for a recent survey of this literature. 
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Recently, the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy has been of interest for 
policy makers, precisely due to the role of such financial institutions during the 2007-2009 
crisis, as a vehicle for the propagation and amplification of the monetary shocks to the real 
economy (Peek and Rosengren 2012). The literature has highlighted that increasing levels 
of uncertainty during the crisis, alongside a significant liquidity reduction experienced 
during that period (Stock and Watson 2012; Bordo, et al. 2016), might have led banks to 
reduce the monetary policy transmission, compared to the pre-crisis period, as the interest 
rate approached its Zero Lower Bound-ZLB (Adams-Kane et al. 2015; Apergis and Cristou 
2015). Such lack of effectiveness of the monetary policy can be seen as part of a long run 
tendency, as documented by Endut et al. (2017) and Vera (2012), or alternatively, it can be 
seen as a recent phenomenon, starting approximately in 2011, when the interest rate in the 
Treasury yields curve, at two and three years to maturity, became more or less insensitive 
to the news. In both cases, traditional fiscal and monetary policies may have lost their 
efficacy, as documented by Swanson and Williams (2014).  
In this document, we add to the literature by implementing a novel alternative methodology 
based on factor augmented vector autoregressions and sign restrictions seeking to identify 
the credit channel of the monetary policy. This enables us to address some potential 
critiques to the policy effect identification scheme on the credit supply variables on a macro 
basis. Basically, we address issues regarding potentially omitted variables and their related 
confounding dynamics and possible theoretical model misspecifications simultaneously. 
This is important because, as argued by Kashyap et al. (1993), it is not feasible to identify 
the effect of changes in the reference rate on the credit supply simply by looking at the 
behaviour of the banks’ aggregated loans after the policy interventions. The reason is that, 
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after a monetary contraction, bank loans may drop because of a reduction in the aggregated 
demand which is to be expected from the traditional interest rate channel. This is not related 
to the decisions about credit supply made by the financial institutions and therefore should 
be disentangled from the total effect before calculating the pass-through from the interest 
rates to the bank’s credit supply. 
Kashyap et al. (1993) also propose a way to handle this conundrum. They suggest 
analysing the firms’ balance sheet movements in the liabilities side, looking for changes in 
alternative funding mechanisms available to companies after the credit reduction has 
occurred. That is, an increment in the amount of commercial papers issued by firms is 
expected after a reduction in the credit supply provided by banks. One could use this 
information to properly identify the supply side in the credit reduction dynamics. If a 
reduction in bank loans occurs joint to an increase in the volume of commercial papers 
issued by firms, we could argue in favour of the existence of the credit supply channel, and 
the confounding variation associated with the aggregated demand would be effectively 
isolated.  
We follow the suggestion by Kashyap et al. (1993) to identify the pass-through of the 
interest rates to the credit supply. However, unlike them, we introduce the substitution 
effect that exists between bank loans and commercial papers in a FAVAR set up. As is well 
known, the FAVAR framework allows the researcher to condition the estimation results on 
richer information and to control for other possible confounding dynamics, otherwise 
absent from the model. 
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Finally, we naturally impose the substitution effect in our model using sign restrictions. 
Sign restrictions have the additional advantage of addressing the problem of model 
identification uncertainty in a systematic way, which is fundamental in macroeconomic 
empirical exercises.  
Our main results support some past views in the field that cast serious doubts on the 
existence of the credit channel during crisis episodes. This result is robust to changes in the 
monetary policy variables, and to changes on the horizon of the sign restrictions.  
This document is organized as follows. In section 2, we revise our methodological set up in 
more detail, which involves describing FAVAR models and sign restrictions. We also 
describe our data in this section. We present our main results in section 3, including some 
robustness exercises. Section 4 summarizes our main conclusions, policy implications and 
some limitations of our study.  
2. Methods and Data 
We use a FAVAR model to identify the structural monetary innovations of the system 
using theoretical sign restrictions. In our baseline scenario, our restrictions involve that a 
positive shock on the interest rate must be followed, during at least twelve months, by 
positive dynamics in the same variable (to guarantee the direction of the shock). Second, a 
positive shock to the interest rate must induce a reduction of bank loans for at least twelve 
months. Afterwards, to properly distinguish between the credit channel (the contractionary 
monetary policy shock inducing a curbing of credit supply) and the traditional interest rate 
channel of the monetary policy (the contractionary monetary policy shock inducing a 
curbing of credit demand), we analyze the impulse-response functions recovered from a 
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shock to the interest rate on the series of commercial papers. In the case that commercial 
papers series increases after the original positive shock to the interest rate, we could argue 
in favor of the credit channel existence during the sample period. 
This last step allows us to elucidate whether the credit channel is present in the sample 
period, controlling for possible confounding effects. The confounding effects may appear 
due to other sources of variations, induced by changes in terms of market liquidity and 
shrinking demand expectations, following an increment in the interest rate. Nevertheless, 
we perform, in section 3, several robustness exercises, changing the horizons of our 
restrictions, which confirm our main findings.  
2.1. Factor augmented vector autoregressions 
Bernanke et al. (2005) proposed FAVAR models aiming to overcome two important 
criticisms to the original VARs. Namely, when using traditional VARs, the researcher is 
forced to exclude too many variables from the analysis because otherwise it is not feasible 
to achieve first-order efficient estimations of the dynamics within the system. This is due to 
the high number of coefficients associated with each variable, which needs to be estimated 
in this traditional framework. Therefore, the model can handle a relatively low maximum 
number of shocks, given by the number of variables that generate feasible estimates. This 
strategy leaves unexplained different dynamics outside the system that may be of interest 
for the researcher or the policy maker. It also lacks control on the confounding dynamics 
associated with such variables, which might lead to inconsistent estimators. Second, the 
FAVAR approach allows the research to construct direct estimations of abstract concepts 
such as ‘economy activity’, ‘interest rates’ or ‘prices’, among others, without having to 
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resort to proxy-variables, which might be inaccurate or difficult to justify. For the 
aforementioned reasons, FAVAR models have currently become a major tool for economic 
analysis, and numerous studies have used them to improve estimations of different 
macroeconomic dynamics, particularly in the context of identification and quantification of 
the monetary policy effects on real and nominal variables (Belviso and Milani 2006; 
Jimborean and Mésonnier 2010; Dave et al. 2013; Ellis et al. 2014; Munir and Qayyum 
2014; Eickmeier, et al. 2015). 
Formally, let 𝒀𝒕  be a 𝑀 × 1  vector of observable variables, which captures the main 
dynamics in the economy. 𝑭𝒕  be a 𝐾 × 1  vector of factors that contains unobservable 
variables, which are not included in 𝒀𝒕. The joint dynamics of (𝒀𝒕, 𝑭𝒕) are given by: 
[
𝑭𝒕
𝒀𝒕
] = 𝑨(𝑳) [
𝑭𝒕−𝟏
𝒀𝒕−𝟏
] + 𝑽𝒕,    (1) 
where 𝑨(𝑳) is a polynomial in the lag operator of order 𝑑, and 𝑽𝒕 is a vector of errors with 
zero-mean and variance-covariance matrix 𝑸. Equation 1 is a FAVAR model. This model 
cannot be estimated directly because the factors 𝑭𝒕  are non-observable. Therefore, such 
factors must be estimated in the process, using techniques such as principal components, 
singular value decompositions or the Kalman filter.  
 
In this paper, the total number of informational series included in the factor estimations, 𝑿𝒕, 
are 𝑁, where 𝐾 + 𝑀 ≪ 𝑁. We follow one of the strategies proposed by Bernanke et al. 
(2005), which consists of two steps: in the first step, we estimate the common components 
of the system, 𝑪𝒕, using the first 𝐾 + 𝑀 principal components of 𝑿𝒕. Then, we extract from 
𝑪𝒕 the variation explained by the observable factors contained in 𝒀𝒕. This is possible simply 
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by using the residuals of a linear projection of 𝑪𝒕 onto 𝒀𝒕. We labelled these residuals as 
our new estimated factors ?̂?𝑡. Replacing 𝑭𝒕 by ?̂?𝒕 in equation 1 enables us to estimate the 
model parameters by ordinary least squares regressions. It is also possible to construct non-
orthogonalized impulse response functions (IRF) in this case, using the MA representation 
of the system in equation 1. The MA representation exists under suitable stationary 
conditions as in any VAR model4. 
2.2. Sign restrictions and identification of structural shocks 
The reduced form VAR in equation 1 can be rewritten in terms of white noise 
innovations, 𝑽𝒕, as  
[
?̂?𝒕
𝒀𝒕
] = [ ?̅?
 ?̅? 
] + 𝑪(𝑳)𝑽𝒕,    (2) 
where ?̅? and ?̅?  are the unconditional means of the processes, and 𝑪(𝑳) is a polynomial in 
the lag operator of infinite order. Structural innovations can be recovered from the system 
in equation 2, imposing theoretical restrictions on the VAR. That is, post-multiplying the 
matrices in 𝑪(𝑳) by a matrix ?̃?, which contains as many theoretical restrictions as needed 
to just-identify the system (or to achieve partial identification, depending on the interests of 
the researcher). In this case, it follows that ?̃?−𝟏𝑽𝒕  = 𝜺𝒕, and therefore, 𝑪(𝑳)?̃? = 𝚽(𝑳), 
where 𝜺𝒕 is a vector of dimensions (𝑀 + 𝐾) × 1, which contains the structural innovations, 
and 𝚽(𝑳) are the structural IRFs of the system, as stated in equation 3: 
                                                        
4 Such standard conditions can be found for instance in Lütkepohl (2006). 
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[
?̂?𝒕
𝒀𝒕
] = [ ?̅?
 ?̅? 
] + 𝚽(𝑳)𝜺𝒕 .    (3) 
One approach proposed by Sims (1980) to carry out the whole system identification is to 
understand ?̃? as one of the triangular matrices arising from the Cholesky factorization of 
the variance-covariance matrix in the reduced form model, 𝑸. Nevertheless, this approach 
has been subject to many criticisms (Faust 1998; Canova and De Nicolo 2002) on the 
grounds that, given a Cholesky factorization, any orthonormal rotation on it will produce a 
different model with different dynamics associated with the structural innovations. Such 
models are, ex ante, equally valid as the original Cholesky factorization, just under a 
different theory. 
Uhlig (2005) proposes to handle this pervasive uncertainty about the structural modelling 
strategy, constructing numerous structural models (matrices ?̃?) and using them to estimate 
structural IRFs. Afterwards, he proposes to select a set of IRFs that agree with the 
theoretical restrictions the researcher is sure (or at least confident) to impose on the data 
generating process. Such a set-identification strategy delivers a group of IRFs, which are in 
principle equally valid, given the restrictions on the signs of their components. Finally, 
some descriptive statistics may be used to portray the set of structural IRFs that conforms to 
the imposed restrictions. In this study, we use the median and some high (86th) and low 
percentiles (14th).  
We propose using sign-restrictions to identify the structural monetary innovations in the 
system because sign-restrictions allow us to focus precisely on the cases in which the credit 
supply channel might be operating. After a contractionary monetary innovation that impacts 
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the interest rate of the economy, a reduction in banks loans must be expected. This 
reduction may be due to a reduction of the credit demand by households and firms, but also 
to a reduction of the credit supply by financial institutions. Thus, our first restriction is to be 
imposed on the bank loans dynamics. In short, bank loans must reduce after the monetary 
innovation is observed.  
Nevertheless, in order to disentangle the reduction of the bank loans due to the supply of 
credit and that due to the credit demand, we also need to analyze the dynamics after the 
shock followed by commercial papers. Commercial papers are a substitute of bank loans, 
which can be used as a funding source by firms, when they face a shortage of credit (that is 
a reduction of the credit supply). Therefore, if the credit supply channel of the monetary 
policy is operating after a contractionary monetary innovation, we should observe an 
increment in the issuing of commercial papers. That is, we should observe firms seeking for 
alternative sources of liquidity to compensate the credit supply reduction. On the contrary, 
a reduction of commercial papers after the shock would imply that firms are not attempting 
to substitute banks loans and, therefore, the original reduction of bank loans should not be 
attributed to a credit shortage, but instead to a reduction in the firms’ willingness to issue 
new debt (i.e. demand considerations). The substitutive nature of bank loans and 
commercial papers has been emphasized by Kashyap et al (1993) who introduced it on an 
Instrumental Variable (IV) setting.  
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Selected sign restrictions must be based on solid theoretical grounds5 because the whole 
identification strategy relies on the imposed signs. We summarized the sign restrictions in 
our baseline scenario as follows:   
o Following an increment in the interest rate, we expect an increment in the FED funds 
rate for at least twelve months. This horizon has been selected following Endut et al. 
(2017), who have shown that 12 months is the minimum persistence that allows for 
consistent results with those extracted from traditional monetary modelling 
frameworks (i.e. Bernanke and Blinder 1992; D’amico and Farka 2011; Keating et al. 
2014). This guarantees that we are identifying a shock with a consistent sign i.e., a 
positive shock. Conversely, we could have imposed a negative restriction following a 
reduction in the interest rate, which is equivalent because our model is symmetric. 
o We expect bank-loans to the firms to decrease after a monetary contraction, during at 
least twelve months. Nevertheless, in section 3.3 we carry out several robustness 
exercises, in which we imposed less stringent requirements on the loans behaviour.  
 
o The effect on prices of monetary policy shocks is traditionally unconstrained as to be 
able to identify if there exists a price puzzle within the system (given the fact that 
getting rid of this puzzle is one of the original motivations for using FAVAR 
models). Regarding some potential restrictions on the non-borrowed reserves, we 
opted for not to include them because these series are extremely flat before the crisis 
                                                        
5 We also attempted to identify the response of the bank loans to an interest rate shock, using a traditional 
Cholesky factorization, and also imposing a decreasing in the issuing of commercial papers one month after 
the shock, and setting free bank loans. In both cases, we were not able to identify plausible scenarios, in the 
sense that the estimated IRFs of traditional variables such as economic activity or prices, presented 
counterintuitive dynamics after the shocks. These results are available upon request. 
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in 2007-2008 and therefore sign restrictions would not identify any behavior 
supported on them. 
 
o Finally, we set the dynamics of the series of commercial papers free.  
The latter point allows us to identify the cause of the decrease in the bank loans that we are 
imposing, using the substitution effect that exists between bank loans and commercial 
papers. In case that we find a positive response of the commercial papers to the interest rate 
shock, we can identify the source of the variation as arising from the credit supply side, 
instead of the credit demand. On the contrary, if there is no reaction in the commercial 
papers series (or the reaction is negative), there will be no evidence to support the credit 
supply channel from the data.  
2.3. Data 
In our baseline estimations we use monthly data from January 2001 to April 2016 for a 
total of 183 observations, the largest time span available for the commercial papers series 
on a monthly basis from our data source. Then, we split our sample into two periods. The 
first period accounts for 82 observations (January 2001- October 2007), and the second 
accounts for 101 (November 2007- April 2016). We used 99 series in the construction of 
our unobservable factors (including the FED interest rate, volume of issued commercial 
papers, commercial and industrial loans by banks). A detailed description of the series and 
the transformations applied to each before attaining stationarity is provided in Table 3 of 
the Appendix. All data were obtained (seasonally adjusted, when required) from the web 
page of the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis (FRED).  
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Given our data, we have that 𝒀𝒕  consists of the variables: new issuing of commercial 
papers, the FED funds interest rate, and the bank loans. On its side ?̂?𝒕 consists of five 
estimated factors (unobservable in nature), which account for the 42.87% of the variance of 
the system (99 variables). As follows 
 𝒀𝒕 = {𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠} 
?̂?𝑡 = {𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 1, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 2, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 3, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 4, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 5} 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Factors 
We use an information criterion (IC) proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) to determine the 
number of unobservable factors. In particular, we use the criterion given by 
𝐼𝐶(𝐾) = 𝑙𝑛(𝑆(𝐾)) + 𝐾 𝑔(𝑁, 𝑇),    (4) 
where 𝑆(𝐾) = (𝑁𝑇)−1 ∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖
𝐾′?̂?𝑡
𝐾  − 𝜆𝑖
𝑀𝑌𝑡
𝑀)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1  is the prediction error divided 
by 𝑁𝑇. 𝐾 is the number of factors, 𝑔(𝑁, 𝑇) is a loss function such that 𝑔(𝑁, 𝑇) =
𝑁+𝑇
𝑁𝑇
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑇
𝑁+𝑇
) and 𝜆𝑖
𝐾,  𝜆𝑖
𝑀  are the factor loadings6 estimated via principal components. The 
number of factors is set according to: 
 𝐾𝐼?̂? =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 
0 ≤ 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐼𝐶(𝐾),     (5) 
                                                        
6 We asume that the full set of variables in the FAVAR 𝑋𝑡  is related to the factors as follows: 𝑋𝑡 =
Λ𝑓𝑭𝒕 + Λ
𝑦𝒀𝒕 + 𝑒𝑡  , where Λ
𝑓  is an N x K matrix of unobservable factor loadings that contains the 
loadings 𝜆𝑖
𝐾  and Λ𝑦 is an N x M observable matrix of factor loadings.  
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where 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum allowed number of factors. We set the maximum number of 
factors equal to 16.   
According to the criterion above, the number of optimal unobservable factors in our model 
is five and consists of 3 lags7 (Figure 1). These five factors explain 42.87% of the total 
variation in the system, which is clearly a high proportion (the expected explained variance 
by five random factors is only above 5.05%). Thus, five factors certainly reduce the 
dimension of the problem while preserving a high variation within the model. 
----Insert Figure 1---- 
We calculate the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the first five factors and some 
macroeconomic variables to gain intuition about what they represent. This is an informal 
analysis, included to motivate possible interpretations of our empirical factors, which are 
used here mainly as a control for possible confounding dynamics, otherwise absent from 
the model. The highest correlations (in absolute values) in each case are presented in Table 
1. As can be seen, the first and the fourth factors are related to industrial and production 
activities in the economy as well as consumption. Factors 3 and 5 capture the dynamics of 
interest rates, and Factor 2 reflects general price dynamics in the economy.  
----Insert Table 1---- 
                                                        
7 This is the minimal order for which the residuals are uncorrelated in time.  
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Finally, each factor is plotted in Figure 2. We also trace the dynamics of Factor 1 against an 
industrial production index in Figure 3, as an argument in favour of interpreting this factor 
as an indicator of ‘economic activity’.8 
----Insert Figure 2---- 
----Insert Figure 3---- 
3.2. Impulse response functions 
We use sign restrictions to construct theoretical impulse-response functions, as explained 
before. We drew from 75,000 simulations, 75,000 ?̃? -matrices that represent different 
theoretical models. Then, we chose according to our restrictions a subset of IRFs. Our 
restrictions allow us to study the dynamics of the system after facing a positive shock to the 
interest rate 9 , alongside a reduction in bank loans. That is, Figures 4 to 9 show the 
dynamics of the Fed funds rate, bank loans, the economic activity factor, the interest rate 
factor, the price factor, and the series of commercial papers, after a positive shock to the 
interest rate. We report the median of the selected IRFs, and the percentiles 86th and 14th. 
We plot only the responses for the period January 2001 to April 2016. In the next sub-
section, we also report the IRFs associated with the commercial papers for two subsamples 
(2001-2007 and 2007-2016).  
                                                        
8 We also estimate our model using subsets of variables seeking to identify each factor directly, instead 
of recovering them from the whole data set. All the qualitative results reported in what follows remain 
and they are available upon request.  
9 The shocks are symmetric, so it makes no difference in the argument to instead claim a reduction in 
the market interest rate.  
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In general lines, we document expected negative effects in terms of economic activity, 
negative effects on prices 10  and positive effects on the market interest rate after an 
increment on the reference interest rate. We also can observe a positive effect on the issuing 
of commercial papers three months after the shock. This can be interpreted as evidence in 
favour of the operation of the credit channel during the sample period.  Our main results are 
robust to using the median target approach by Fry and Pagan (2011). That is, a positive 
response of the commercial papers series is recorded 3-4 months after the shock.  
----Insert Figure 4---- 
----Insert Figure 5---- 
----Insert Figure 6---- 
----Insert Figure 7---- 
----Insert Figure 8---- 
----Insert Figure 9---- 
3.3. Robustness 
Figures 4 to 9 summarize our main results. Nevertheless, they are subject to potential 
criticisms regarding the sample used in the estimation, the horizon at which the sign 
restrictions are imposed, or the proxy used to measure the monetary policy stance. 
                                                        
10 We have rotated the sing of the IRF associated to the price factor to present the results in a more 
intuitive fashion. Note that factor is identified up to a column sign rotation and in our case, it presents a 
negative correlation with the price series 
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Regarding the sample, one could claim that it is not feasible to identify an increment in the 
interest rate followed by increments in the next 12 months on the same variable, near the 
ZLB. This could lead to disregarding some IRFs that might potentially agree with the credit 
supply channel. For this reason, we constructed the IRFs of the commercial papers using 
information from January 2001 to October 2007 to avoid the ZLB in our estimations. We 
estimate the IRFs using the remaining sample period from November 2007 to April 2016 
for the sake of completeness.  
We also perform an informative analysis changing the horizons at which we impose the 
sign restrictions on the whole sample and on the two subsamples. We do so because one 
could claim that, for instance, a sign restriction that forces bank loans to decrease in the 
same month that the interest rate increases is a very stringent requirement. We acknowledge 
this situation, which could be related to a possible delay in the reaction of bank loans to a 
change in the interest rate. Consistently, we estimate IRFs using different horizons for the 
sign restrictions. In particular, we impose the restriction over the bank loans IRFs: i) from 
the third to the sixth month, ii) from the sixth to the ninth month, and iii) from the third to 
the ninth month. We assume in all the cases above that an interest rate increment is 
followed by a change with the same sign on their own lagged dynamics for 12 months. We 
also relax the last requirement allowing for restrictions on the bank loans and the interest 
rate to operate during the same time span, specifically, at months: i) from zero to three, ii) 
from zero to six and, iii) from zero to twelve. All the combinations are reported in Table 2, 
alongside the number of structural IRFs that we were able to identify in each case. The 
IRFs’ commercial papers are plotted in Figures 10, 11 and 12.  
----Insert Table 2---- 
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----Insert Figure 10---- 
----Insert Figure 11---- 
----Insert Figure 12---- 
As can be observed, our main conclusions hold in any case. For the pre-crisis sample, there 
are restriction sets that lead to identify a positive peak on the IRFs of commercial papers 
around month 411 after the shock, which may be interpreted as evidence in favour of the 
existence of the credit supply channel. However, in all the cases when this peak is found 
(restriction from the 1st to 6th, 3rd to 6th months and 3rd to 9th), there is also a negative peak 
in the function around the fifth month after the shock. This negative peak can be associated 
to a reduction in the use of external debt as a funding mechanism in favour of new shares 
issuing. 
We would like to emphasize on the fact that in the second part of our sample (2007-2016), 
although it is possible to identify some scenarios for which an increment in the interest 
rates is followed by a reduction in bank loans, those are very few (less than 10% in all the 
cases, and between 7 and 16 IRFs in the vast majority of cases). That is, bank loans do not 
tend to decrease after an increment in the interest rate, neither as a consequence of the 
credit channel nor due to any other channel through aggregate demand.  
We also attempted to recover the structural IRFs by directly imposing a restriction on the 
commercial papers. That is, we impose the restriction that after a positive shock to the Fed 
                                                        
11 Our results are robust to reducing the number of factors to two factors (this increasing the degrees of 
freedom), in the pre-ZLB and post-ZLB sample periods. 
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funds rate, commercial papers series must increase, and we leave unconstrained the 
dynamics of bank loans (we use several horizons for the restrictions). Nevertheless, we 
were not able to recover any structural IRF with the required characteristics. We do not 
report the results here, but those confirm our previous results. In this case, there are not 
theoretical scenarios that agree with both, an increment in the interest rate and an increase 
in commercial papers, which can be recovered from the data.  
As an additional robustness exercise, we estimated the IRFs associated to a traditional VAR 
model (without factors) and we compared them with the functions derived from our 
FAVAR specification. The main results are summarized in Figures 13 and 14. As can be 
observed in the former figure, after a positive shock to the interest rate, the FAVAR model 
is able to generate responses with the expected theoretical signs and persistence. That is, 
after a positive shock to the interest rate, the economic activity factor decreases for around 
six months, while the price factor decreases in the two following years. On the contrary, the 
traditional VAR specification portrays an increment in production and a negative response 
of prices (which has the correct sign but lacks persistence), after the increment in the 
interest rate has occurred.  
----Insert Figure 13---- 
----Insert Figure 14---- 
Regarding the credit channel variables, in figure 14 we observe that surprisingly the 
responses of commercial papers and loans to the interest rate shock are similar 
independently of the model employed. Nevertheless, the estimations from the FAVAR 
model are smoother and display higher persistence than those arising from the VAR model. 
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The FAVAR with sign restrictions model also incorporates into the modeling framework 
the “model uncertainty” inherent to the identification assumptions. It also allows to 
incorporate in the system information that otherwise would be intractable (Bernanke, 
2005). For these reason, we rely on the estimations of the FAVAR framework instead of 
the VAR model. 
Finally, the evidence documented above is also robust to change the monetary policy 
variable in our estimations by and alternative indicator proposed by Wu and Xia (2016). 
Those authors construct a shadow interest rate, using a dynamic factor model, which has 
two advantages over the traditional interest rate used in our baseline exercise. Namely, the 
shadow interest rate considers a richer information set when approaching monetary policy 
conditions and, this rate presents a greater variability after 2008 compared to the traditional 
FED’s rate. In this case, once again, we were not able to recover IRFs that fit our 
theoretical sign restrictions after the crisis period. We do not report these results here, but 
they are available upon request.  
3.4. Discussion  
We report two main findings: first, after the crisis, in the vicinity of the ZLB of the interest 
rate, it is very difficult to construct hypothetical theoretical scenarios in which an increment 
(or conversely, a decrease) in the interest rate is followed by a reduction (increment) in the 
series of banks loans. This result evidences a lack of effectiveness of the monetary policy 
through bank lending activities both because of a possible change in the credit supply or 
due to a variation in the aggregate demand (and consequently, in the credit demand). This is 
a general result, which casts doubts about the effectiveness of the monetary policy in 
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stimulating real private investment during crisis periods and in inducing the apparition of 
new credit funds provided by banks to this end. 
Second, when these sorts of hypothetical scenarios can be isolated (mainly before the crisis 
and in the entire sample), we document some evidence on the existence of the credit supply 
channel. That is, commercial papers react positively to changes of the interest rate three 
months after the interest rate shock.  
This result is in line with some previous studies in the literature such as the study of 
Apergis and Cristou (2015) that uses quantile regressions and document ineffectiveness of 
the monetary policy during recession episodes, when the nominal interest rates are close to 
the ZLB. It is also related to the group of studies referenced in the introduction, which 
provide evidence against the credit channel of the monetary policy in recent times as part of 
a long-term trend in the US economic dynamics (Vera 2012; Adams-Kane et al. 2015; 
Endut et al. 2017; Olmo and Sanso-Navarro 2015).  
Moreover, related conclusions by Dave et al. (2013), in favor of the existence of the credit 
supply channel of the monetary policy, are supported on an analysis of the aggregate bank 
loan dynamics, after a monetary policy shock has occurred. As was mentioned before, 
analyzing the aggregate dynamics of the bank loans presents the drawback of blending the 
responses due to the “supply” and the “demand” sides of the narrative. That is, after a 
contractionary monetary policy shock, a decrease of the aggregate demand is expected, 
following the traditional interest rate channel. This in turn may be followed by a reduction 
of new credit demand for consumption or investment. Nevertheless, the credit channel of 
the monetary policy refers to the supply side of the narrative, and for this reason it is 
 22 
necessary to isolate the variation due only to supply-side considerations. We do so using 
sign-restrictions with respect to a substitutive good of bank loans, namely the issuing of 
commercial papers. Our identification assumption drives our results as to conclude that the 
credit supply channel operates during the sample period but does not operate during crisis 
period. 
Conclusions 
We find evidence on the existence of the credit supply channel of monetary policy for the 
US economy in our sample (from January 2001 to April 2016). This result holds under 
alternative identification schemes, but does not hold during crisis episodes.  
We added to the literature that uses aggregated series to identify the credit supply decisions 
by banks following a change in the interest rate. Our empirical strategy blends FAVAR 
models with sign restrictions, which is new to the literature regarding the credit channel, 
and this enables us to control for model uncertainty (in the structural identification setting) 
and for omitting variables, simultaneously. This addresses some critics about possible 
confounding dynamics that could emerge in the process of identifying credit supply 
decisions and allows us to isolate the credit supply channel from other channels acting 
through the credit demand.   
We acknowledge the point made by Peek and Rosengren (2012) in the sense that an 
aggregated answer should be complemented by a more micro-oriented answer. 
Nevertheless, the aggregated answer is worthwhile on its own right because it considers 
other possible confounding dynamics though the factor structures, which are not considered 
in the micro setting (represented by factors, related to prices, economic activity, interest 
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rates and so on). It also considers the aggregation effect of the individual banks responses, 
which is poorly addressed in more micro-oriented settings.  
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Appendix 
Fig. 1 Percentage of variance explained by the 99 principal components 
 
Note: The percentage of explained variance in the system is plotted against the k-th principal components. 
The number of optimal factors to include in the model is five, following the AIC criterion. The black bars 
correspond to the total of variance explained by the first five factors (42.87%). 
Table 1. Correlation between factors and macroeconomic variables 
Factor 1 Correlation 
Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials 0.71 
Industrial Production Index: Durable Materials 0.70 
Personal Consume Expenditures 0.69 
Consumer Price Index: All items less Food 0.66 
Industrial Production Index: Manufacturing 0.66 
Consumer Price Index 0.66 
  
Factor 2 Correlation 
Personal Consume Expenditures Deflactor: Non-Durable -0.68 
Consumer Price Index: Commodities -0.68 
Consumer Price Index -0.68 
Consumer Price Index: All items less Medical Care -0.67 
Consumer Price Index: All items less Food -0.67 
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Consumer Price Index: Transportation -0.65 
  
Factor 3 Correlation 
Spread: 6 Months Tresasury Bonds – Federal Funds Rate -0.69 
Spread: 1 Year Tresasury Bonds – Federal Funds Rate -0.68 
Spread: 10 Years Tresasury Bonds – Federal Funds Rate -0.67 
Spread: 5 Years Tresasury Bonds – Federal Funds Rate -0.66 
Spread: Aaa Bonds– Federal Funds Rate -0.71 
Spread: 3 Months Tresasury Bonds – Federal Funds Rate -0.71 
  
Factor 4 Correlation 
Industrial Production Index: Final Production -0.48 
Industrial Production Index: Manufacturing -0.42 
Industrial Production Index -0.41 
Capacity Utilization -0.41 
1 Year Tresasury Bonds Rate 0.46 
5 Year Tresasury Bonds Rate 0.44 
  
Factor 5 Correlation 
10 Year Tresasury Bonds Rate 0.66 
Bond Yield: Moody's Aaa Corporate 0.65 
5 Year Tresasury Bonds Rate 0.60 
Bond Yield: Moody's Baa Corporate 0.59 
Industrial Production Index: Non-Durable Materials 0.46 
1 Year Tresasury Bonds Rate -0.46 
Note: Highest correlations between the factors in our model and some macroeconomics variables. Factors 1 
and 4 are more related to industrial and production activities; Factors 3 and 5 to interest rates; and Factor 2 
appears to capture the general price dynamics in the economy.  
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Fig. 2 Factors 2001-2016 
 
 
Note: Factors included in our FAVAR. Factors 1 and 4 are related to production and consumption, while 
Factors 3 and 5 are related to interest rates, and Factor 2 is related to prices. 
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Fig. 3 Industrial production index and factor 1 (economic activity) 
 
Note: The plot illustrates the remarkable similar paths during the sample period of Factor 1 and an Industrial 
production Index.  
Fig. 4 Response of the federal funds rate to a contractionary monetary shock 
 
Note: The black line is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the interest rates. The 
grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The IRFs were calculated using the 
full sample from 2001 to 2016. 
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Fig. 5 Response of the bank-loans to a contractionary monetary shock 
 
Note: The black line is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the interest rates. The 
grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The IRFs were calculated using the 
full sample from 2001 to 2016. 
Fig. 6 Response of factor 1 (economic activity) to a contractionary monetary shock 
 
Note: The black line is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the interest rates. The 
grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The IRFs were calculated using the 
full sample from 2001 to 2016. 
-0.003
-0.003
-0.002
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
-0.025
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
 33 
Fig. 7 Response of factor 5 (interest rates) to a contractionary monetary shock 
 
Note: The black line is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the interest rates. The 
grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The IRFs were calculated using the 
full sample from 2001 to 2016. 
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Fig. 8 Response of factor 2 (Prices) to a contractionary monetary shock 
 
 
Note: The black line is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the interest rates. The 
grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The IRFs were calculated using the 
full sample from 2001 to 2016.  
Fig. 9 Response of the commercial papers series to a contractionary monetary policy shock 
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Note: The black line is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the interest 
rates. The grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The IRFs were 
calculated using the full sample from 2001 to 2016.  
Table 2. Number of identified IRFs for each scenario, regarding horizon restrictions 
and sample period, with 75,000 rotations 
Restriction Over Bank Loans Restriction Over Fed Funds Rate 2001-2007 2007-2016 2001-2016 
1 to 3 months 1 to 3 months 2,802 IRFs 5,083 IRFs 3,189 IRFs 
1 to 6 months 1 to 6 months 518 IRFs 81 IRFs 657 IRFs 
1 to 12 months (Base Scenario) 1 to 12 months 232 IRFs 3 IRF 98 IRFs 
3 to 6 months 1 to 12 months 513 IRFs 16 IRF 550 IRFs 
3 to 9 months 1 to 12 months 362 IRFs 7 IRF 202 IRFs 
6 to 9 months 1 to 12 months 502 IRFs 15 IRFs 234 IRFs 
6 to 12 months 1 to 12 months 305 IRFs 11 IRFs 103 IRFs 
Note: In the first two columns, there is the number of periods for which the sign restrictions hold in 
each scenario. In columns 3 to 5, we report the number of IRFs that satisfy the restrictions in each 
case. 
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Fig. 10 Commercial papers’ IRFs: 2001-2016 
 
Note: The black line in each sub-plot is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive 
shock to the interest rates. The grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th 
percentiles.  
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Fig. 11 Commercial papers’ IRF: 2001-2007 
Note: The black line in each sub-plot is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive 
shock to the interest rates. The grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th 
percentiles.  
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Fig. 12 Commercial papers’ IRFs: 2007-2016 
 
Note: The black line in each sub-plot is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive 
shock to the interest rates. The grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th 
percentiles.  
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Fig. 13 Response of production and prices to an interest rate shock from VAR and 
FAVAR models 
VAR Estimation FAVAR Estimation 
  
  
Note: The black line in each sub-plot is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the 
interest rates. The grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The responses 
on the left hand side correspond to a traditional VAR, while on the right hand side to our benchmark model.  
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Fig. 14 Response of the credit channel variables to an interest rate shock from VAR 
and FAVAR models  
 
 
VAR Estimation FAVAR Estimation 
  
  
Note: The black line in each sub-plot is the median of the identified IRFs, following a positive shock to the 
interest rates. The grey lines are credibility bands of the IRF at the 84th and 16th percentiles. The responses on 
the left-hand side correspond to a traditional VAR, while on the right hand side to our benchmark model. 
 
  
-0.400
-0.300
-0.200
-0.100
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
Commercial Papers
-0.250
-0.200
-0.150
-0.100
-0.050
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
Commercial Papers
-0.005
-0.004
-0.004
-0.003
-0.003
-0.002
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
0.000
0.001
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
Loans 
-0.003
-0.003
-0.002
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
Loans
 41 
Table 3. Series and transformations to achieve stationarity 
# Variable 
Conversion 
Method 
1 Real Personal Income Chained (2009) Growth Rate 
2 Personal Income Less Transferences Chained (2009) Growth Rate 
3 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures Growth Rate 
4 Retail Sales Growth Rate 
5 Industrial Production Index-Total Index Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
6 Industrial Production Index-Consumer Goods Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
7 Industrial Production Index-Products Total Index Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
8 Industrial Production Index-Nondurable Consumer Goods Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
9 Industrial Production Index-Durable Consumer Goods Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
10 Industrial Production Index-Materials Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
11 Industrial Production Index-Business Equipment Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
12 Industrial Production Index-Durable Materials Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
13 Industrial Production Index-Manufacturing Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
14 Industrial Production Index-Nondurable Materials Chained (2007) Growth Rate 
15 Industrial Production Index-Fuels (2007) Growth Rate 
16 Leading Index Growth Rate 
17 Capacity Utilization Growth Rate 
18 Producer Price Index: Finished Goods Growth Rate 
19 Producer Price Index: Intermed Materials and Components Growth Rate 
20 Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods Growth Rate 
21 Producer Price Index: Nonferrous Materials Growth Rate 
22 Producer Price Index: Crude Materials Growth Rate 
23 Consumer Price Index: All Items Growth Rate 
24 Consumer Price Index: Apparel Growth Rate 
25 Consumer Price Index: Transportation Growth Rate 
26 Consumer Price Index: Medical Care Growth Rate 
27 Consumer Price Index: Commodities Growth Rate 
28 Consumer Price Index: Durables Growth Rate 
29 Consumer Price Index: Services Growth Rate 
30 Consumer Price Index: All Items Less Shelter Growth Rate 
31 Consumer Price Index: All Items Less Food Growth Rate 
32 Consumer Price Index: All Items Less Medical Care Growth Rate 
33 Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator Growth Rate 
34 Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator: Nondurables Growth Rate 
35 Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator: Services Growth Rate 
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36 Commercial Papers Rate Growth Rate 
37 U.S Treasury Bills: 3 Months Growth Rate 
38 U.S Treasury Bills: 6 Months Growth Rate 
39 U.S Treasury Bills: 1 year Growth Rate 
40 U.S Treasury Bills: 5 years Growth Rate 
41 U.S Treasury Bills: 10 years Growth Rate 
42 Bond Yield: Moody’s Aaa Corporate Growth Rate 
43 Bond Yield: Moody’s Baa Corporate Growth Rate 
44 CP-Federal Fund Rate spread Levels 
45 3 mo-Federal Funds Rate spread Levels 
46 6 mo-Federal Funds Rate spread Levels 
47 1 yr-Federal Funds Rate spread Levels 
48 5 yr-Federal Funds Rate spread Levels 
49 10 yr-Federal Funds Rate spread Levels 
50 Aaa-Federal Funds Rate spread Levels 
51 Baa-Federal Funds Rate spread Levels 
52 Foreign Exchange Rate: Switzerland - Swiss Franc Per U.S.$ Growth Rate 
53 Foreign Exchange Rate: United Kingdom- U.S.$ Per Pound Growth Rate 
54 Foreign Exchange Rate: Japan - Yen Per U.S.$ Growth Rate 
55 Foreign Exchange Rate: Canada - Canadian $ Per U.S.$ Growth Rate 
56 Commercial Papers Issues Growth Rate 
57 Commercial and Industrial Loans Growth Rate 
58 Manufacture’s New Orders, Durable Goods Industries Growth Rate 
59 Manufacture’s New Orders, Capital Growth Rate 
60 Mfrs Unfilled Orders, Capital Growth Rate 
61 Ratio, Manufacturing And Trade Inventories To Sales Growth Rate 
62 Manufacturing And Trade Sales Growth Rate 
63 Federal Funds Rate Growth Rate 
64 Housing Starts: Nonfarm Growth Rate 
65 Housing Starts: Northeast Growth Rate 
66 Housing Starts: Midwest Growth Rate 
67 Housing Starts: South Growth Rate 
68 Housing Starts: West Growth Rate 
69 Housing Authorized: Total New Private Housing Units Growth Rate 
70 Employees On Nonfarm Payrolls: Total Private Growth Rate 
71 Employees On Nonfarm Payrolls - Construction Growth Rate 
72 Employees On Nonfarm Payrolls - Manufacturing Growth Rate 
73 Employees On Nonfarm Payrolls - Trade, Transportation, And Utilities Growth Rate 
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74 Employees On Nonfarm Payrolls - Financial Activities Growth Rate 
75 Average Weekly Hours of Production or Nonsup Workers Private Nonfarm - Goods-Producing First Difference 
76 Average Weekly Hours of Production or Nonsup Workers Private Nonfarm - Manufacturing First Difference 
77 Average Weekly Hours, Manufacturing First Difference 
78 Avg Hourly Earnings of Prod or Nonsup Workers Private Nonfarm - Goods Production Growth Rate 
79 Avg Hourly Earnings of Prod or Nonsup Workers Private Nonfarm - Construction Growth Rate 
80 Avg Hourly Earnings of Prod or Nonsup Workers Private Nonfarm - Manufacturing Growth Rate 
81 M1 Growth Rate 
82 M2 Growth Rate 
83 Currency Growth Rate 
84 M2 Real Growth Rate 
85 Monetary Base Growth Rate 
86 Depository Institutions Reserves Growth Rate 
87 Consumer Credit Outstanding Growth Rate 
88 Civilian Labor Force: Employed, Total Growth Rate 
89 Unemployment Rate: All Workers, 16 Years & Over Growth Rate 
90 Unemploy. By Duration: Average Duration In Weeks Growth Rate 
91 Unemploy By Duration: Persons Unempl Less Than 5 Weeks Growth Rate 
92 Unemploy By Duration: Persons Unempl 5 To 14 Wks Growth Rate 
93 Unemploy By Duration: Persons Unempl 15 Wks + Growth Rate 
94 Unemploy By Duration: Persons Unempl 15 To 26 Wks Growth Rate 
95 Unemploy By Duration: Persons Unempl 27 Wks + Growth Rate 
96 Initial Claims for Unemployement Insurance Growth Rate 
97 WTI Growth Rate 
98 S&P 500 Growth Rate 
99 Depository Inst Reserves:Nonborrowed Growth Rate 
 
